A chaos-based image encryption algorithm was proposed in [Z.-H. Guan, F. Huang, W. Guan, Phys. Lett. A 346 (2005) 153]. In this Letter, we analyze the security weaknesses of the proposal. By applying chosenplaintext and known-plaintext attacks, we show that all the secret parameters can be revealed.
Introduction
In this Letter, we give a complete break of the chaos-based image encryption algorithm proposed in [1] . The algorithm uses Arnold's cat map [2] to shuffle the image pixels and Chen's chaotic system [3] to change the gray levels of the shuffled image pixels.
The outline of the Letter is as follows. In the next section we describe the encryption algorithm in detail. In Section 3, we demonstrate a chosen-plaintext attack that reveals all the secret parameters. In Section 4, we do the same with a known-plaintext attack. In Section 5, we illustrate the success of our break with simulation examples. Finally, we give concluding remarks.
Description of the encryption algorithm
The encryption process consists of two parts. In the first part, the algorithm takes an image P and shuffles its pixels using Arnold cat map. The second part of the algorithm changes the gray levels of the pixels using Chen's chaotic system.
Arnold cat map
Assume that we have an N × N image P with the pixel coordinates I = {(x, y) | x, y = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N − 1}. Arnold cat map is given where p, q are positive integers and x , y are the coordinate values of the shuffled pixel. After iterating this map n times, we have
where
The shuffled image S is related to the original image P as
Chen's chaotic system
Chen's chaotic system is a set of differential equations given aṡ
where a, b and c are parameters of the system. Chen's system is 
Encryption algorithm
In this section, we describe the encryption algorithm in detail. (1) Shuffle the image P using Arnold cat map and obtain the shuffled image S. (2) By scanning the image S row-by-row, arrange its pixels as the sequence S = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s N×N }. 
where x denotes the largest integer not larger than x. Here, we assume that the encryption setup represents the real numbers with 14 decimal digits after the point.
(5) Obtain the encrypted sequence C = {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c N×N } as
where ⊕ represents bitwise exclusive OR operation. (6) By reshaping the sequence C into an N × N image, obtain the ciphertext image.
Chosen-plaintext attack
In this section, we describe how the secret parameters of the proposed encryption algorithm can be extracted using a chosenplaintext attack.
If an attacker knows the parameters M and K , he can reverse the two steps of the encryption and decrypt a ciphertext image. Indeed, if an attacker knows K , by using (5), he can obtain the shuffled image S. If he also knows M, he uses (2) and obtains the original image P . Thus, there are only two secret parameters to extract and these are M and K . The attack consists of two steps. First, K is recovered. Then, the attacker uses K in calculating the key M of Arnold cat map.
Extracting K
The attacker choses an image P 1 that consists of N × N zerovalued pixels, and obtains the corresponding ciphertext image, C 1 .
The shuffling process does not change the image because P 1 is identically 0. Hence, the shuffled image S 1 is equal to the image P 1 . Using this fact and (5), the attacker can easily see that the cipher-image C 1 is exactly equal to the key K as
Extracting M
The attacker choses another image P 2 and gets the corresponding ciphertext image C 2 . The image P 2 is chosen such that it contains only two non-zero and distinct pixels P 2 (1, 1) = v 1 , P 2 (1, 2) = v 2 so that v 1 = v 2 and v 1,2 = 0. The attacker already knows K . By using (5), the attacker obtains the corresponding shuffled image S 2 from C 2 as
Now, the attacker has the image P 2 and the corresponding shuffled image S 2 . By searching for pixel values v 1 , v 2 in S 2 , the attacker determines the shuffled coordinates (x 1 , y 1 ) and (x 2 , y 2 ).
Using (2), the attacker obtains the following sets of equations:
Solving these equations, the attacker finds that
Hence, the key M is extracted. Now, the attacker has all the secret parameters of the encryption algorithm.
Known-plaintext attack
In this section, we describe how the secret parameters of the proposed encryption algorithm can be extracted using a known plaintext attack. In this case, the attacker does not choose plaintexts. Instead, we assume that he has obtained some plaintextciphertext pairs. The attack consists of two steps; the first step is to calculate the key of Arnold cat map, M, and the second step is to extract the key K of Chen's chaotic system.
Extracting M
Assume that the attacker knows two plaintext-ciphertext image pairs (P 1 , C 1 ) and (P 2 , C 2 ). Let us define the differences as P = P 1 ⊕ P 2 and C = C 1 ⊕ C 2 . Using (5), the attacker calculates
Hence, the attacker can calculate S. Going from P to S, there is only shuffling by the Arnold cat map. Next, we give a method to reveal the parameters of this map.
Let P (x 1 , y 1 ) = v 1 , P (x 2 , y 2 ) = v 2 be two pixels of P with different values, i.e. v 1 = v 2 . Let (x 1 , y 1 ) and (x 2 , y 2 ) denote their respective coordinates in S. Using (2), we have
where U = x 1 x 2 y 1 y 2 . Let V 1 denote the set of coordinates at which S has value v 1 . Namely,
Similarly, define the set V 2 as
Assuming that U is invertible, let us define the set V of matrices as
By the definitions of the sets V 1 and V 2 , we have (x 1 , y 1 ) ∈ V 1 and (x 2 , y 2 ) ∈ V 2 . So, using (7), we conclude that M ∈ V .
Thus, once the attacker constructs the set V , he has |V | = |V 1 ||V 2 | candidates for M. Repeating the procedure with another pair of pixels P (x 1 ,ȳ 1 ) =v 1 , P (x 2 ,ȳ 2 ) =v 2 ,v 1 =v 2 , he finds another setV that contains M. Obviously,
Continuing in this fashion, he intersect more and more sets until the intersection contains only one element. This element is necessarily M.
In order to make the set V of candidates smaller, the attacker chooses rare pixel pairs in P .
Extracting K
The attacker knows the image P 1 and the corresponding cipher image C 1 . Using (2) and the Arnold cat map parameter M revealed in the previous step, the attacker calculates S 1 .
Using S 1 in (5), the attacker obtains Chen's chaotic system parameter K as
Thus, the attacker knows all the secret parameters of the encryption algorithm.
Simulation results
In order to illustrate each type of attacks, we give simulation results for two cases. Simulations are performed under MATLAB running on Mac OS X 10.5.4 with Intel Core 2 Duo 2.16 GHz processor and 2 GB RAM. The secret parameters are chosen from the example in [1] . Arnold cat map parameters are: p = 1, q = 1, n = 5, Chen's chaotic system parameters are: a = 35, b = 3, c = 28, The initial conditions for the Chen system are: x 0 = −10.058, y 0 = 0.368, z 0 = 37.368.
In the first simulation, we illustrate the chosen-plaintext attack.
The attacker chooses the following two 9 × 9 images as plaintexts: 
Note that the first image consists of zero valued pixels and the second image has only two nonzero pixels. By (6), the first secret parameter M is M = 7 1 1 8 mod 9.
The ciphertext C 1 , which is also the Chen key K , is given as Using C 2 , the attacker calculates S 2 as S 2 = C 2 ⊕ K . S 2 is given as 
Inspecting S 2 , the attacker finds that x 1 = 8, y 1 = 0, x 2 = 0, y 2 = 8. Substituting these into (6), the attacker finds M.
In the second simulation, we illustrate the known-plaintext attack. Assume that the attacker knows the two 256 × 256 plaintext images in Fig. 1(a) and 1(b) . The difference images P = P 1 ⊕ P 2 and C = C 1 ⊕ C 2 are also shown in Fig. 1(c) and 1(d Finally, after calculating S 1 using (2), the attacker reveals K as K = C 1 ⊕ S 1 . K is given in Fig. 2 .
Conclusion
In this Letter, we gave a complete break of a chaos-based image encryption algorithm. We demonstrated that the secret keys can be revealed using chosen and known plaintext attacks.
